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TRUST REPAIR AFTER AN ORGANIZATION-
LEVEL FAILURE
NICOLE GILLESPIE
University of Melbourne
GRAHAM DIETZ
Durham University
We propose a systemic, multilevel framework for understanding trust repair at the
organizational level. Drawing on systems theory, we theorize how each component of
an organization’s system shapes employees’ perceptions of the organization’s trust-
worthiness and can contribute to failures and effective trust repair. We distinguish the
framework from prior work grounded in dyadic assumptions and propose underlying
principles and a four-stage process for organizational trust repair. Finally, we explore
the implications for research and practice.
A fundamental assumption inherent in most
employment relationships is that the employer
will operate in a trustworthy manner (Galford &
Drapeau, 2003). High trust levels are common
early in such relationships (Robinson, 1996),
with trustworthiness a “given” in the absence of
contrary evidence (McKnight, Cummings, &
Chervany, 1998). But what happens when one’s
employer acts in a manner that undermines this
perception of trustworthiness?
Prominent examples of such incidents—what
we term organization-level failures—include ac-
counting frauds (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Parma-
lat); deceit (e.g., plagiarized and fabricated re-
ports by the New York Times); incompetence
(e.g., the U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s response to Hurricane Katrina); fatal,
avoidable accidents (e.g., Union Carbide’s
chemical spill at Bhopal, BP’s Texas City refin-
ery fire, Townsend Thoresen/P&O’s ferry sinking
at Zeebrugge); exploitation of vulnerable people
(e.g., use of child labor sweatshops); massive
compulsory job losses (e.g., IBM in the 1990s);
and bankruptcies and catastrophic collapses in
organizational finance (e.g., AIG, Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae, Northern Rock).
There are several potential consequences of
organization-level failures. Although employees
will differ in their emotional and behavioral re-
sponses (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Mishra, 1996), the
distress and uncertainty can be profoundly un-
settling for those who have invested their effort,
reputation, and career ambitions in the service
of a now discredited organization. The loss of
trust and resulting distrust may manifest in em-
ployees’ reduced willingness to display the kind
of trust-informed behaviors that contribute to
effective operational functioning (Dirks & Ferrin,
2001), as well as withdrawal (Robinson, 1996)
and even obstructionism and acts of retaliation
(Bies & Tripp, 1996). The failure can lead to a
breakdown or renegotiation of internal and ex-
ternal relationships.
Research suggests that broken trust can be
repaired (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Mur-
nighan, 2002; Mishra, 1996), with much depend-
ing on the violator’s response (Korsgaard, Brodt,
& Whitener, 2002; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Brad-
ley, 2006). However, most organizations respond
poorly to trust failures (Schwartz & Gibb, 1999),
typically acting too late, with inappropriate
equivocation, and with less regard for internal
relations than for external relations. Given the
prevalence of trust failures in organizations
(Mishra, 1996; Robinson, 1996) and the serious-
ness of their consequences, knowing how to re-
pair trust has become a “critical management
competency” (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Yet, to
date, little attention has been paid to repairing
trust at the organizational level.
Drawing on prior research and theory on trust,
systems and multilevel theory, crisis manage-
ment, and strategic organizational change, we
propose a framework for analyzing and repairing
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employees’ perceptions of their organization’s
trustworthiness. In developing our framework, we
first define organizational trustworthiness and
organization-level failures and briefly review
prior research on trust repair. We then concep-
tualize organizations as multilevel systems and
identify the components that contribute to per-
ceptions of the organization’s trustworthiness,
as well as to failures. With these foundations in
place, we identify the underlying mechanisms
and principles for organizational trust repair
and illustrate how these operate through each
system component and each stage of our trust
repair process. In the final section we describe
the implications for research and practice.
DEFINITIONS
Organizational Trustworthiness
In this paper we focus on employees’ percep-
tions of the trustworthiness of their organization
and the processes required for repairing these
perceptions once they are damaged by an orga-
nization-level failure. Perceived organizational
trustworthiness relates to the set of “confident
positive expectations” employees have about
the intentions and likely future actions of their
employer (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998).
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) identified
three dimensions of trustworthiness, which we
adapt to the organizational level: (1) ability (the
organization’s collective competencies and char-
acteristics that enable it to function reliably and
effectively to meet its goals and responsibilities),
(2) benevolence (organizational action indicating
genuine care and concern for the well-being of
stakeholders), and (3) integrity (organizational ac-
tion that consistently adheres to moral principles
and a code of conduct acceptable to employees,
such as honesty and fairness).
Employees use these characteristics to evalu-
ate a variety of targets, including immediate
working relationships (Butler, 1991), senior man-
agement (Mayer & Davis, 1999), internal groups,
and the organization itself (Robinson, 1996). In
making judgments about the overall trustwor-
thiness of their organization, employees con-
sider these multiple actors, as well as sources of
evidence drawn from multiple organizational
components and levels (Galford & Drapeau,
2003; Nooteboom, 2002). Hence, trust is a “meso”
concept (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer,
1998), integrating microlevel psychological pro-
cesses and group dynamics with macrolevel or-
ganizational and institutional forms. Our level
of analysis is primarily at the individual level—
that is, employees’ perceived organizational
trustworthiness. However, following Morgeson
and Hofmann (1999), we also see organizational
trustworthiness as a collective construct—a
sensemaking heuristic originating at the level
of individuals’ perceptions but that, in the ag-
gregate of collective impressions, can operate
as a shared reputation in the organization.
Organizational Failure
We draw on prior research on failures, crises,
and betrayal in organizations to define organi-
zation-level failure as a single major incident, or
cumulative series of incidents, resulting from
the action (or inaction) of organizational agents
that threatens the legitimacy of the organization
and has the potential to harm the well-being of
one or more of the organization’s stakeholders.
We now describe each condition.
First, to manifest at the organizational level,
the failure must be of sufficient magnitude to
threaten the legitimacy of the organization itself
(Anheier, 1999). The crisis of legitimacy may
stem from the failure’s calling into question (1)
the organization’s capacity to fulfill its funda-
mental mission or one of its essential responsi-
bilities (e.g., safe transport for P&O Ferries, ac-
curate journalism for the New York Times)
and/or (2) the organization’s adherence to com-
monly endorsed ethical standards (e.g., to avoid
lethal, exploitative, or dishonest work practices).
In trust terms, the organization has failed in its
responsibility to meet reasonable standards of
ability, benevolence, and/or integrity in its con-
duct toward its stakeholders.
Second, the perceived potential or actual
harm arising from the failure may not necessar-
ily be borne by the employees themselves but,
rather, by other stakeholders, such as custom-
ers, shareholders, or the wider community. Nev-
ertheless, this can affect employees profoundly
by undermining their faith in their employer,
with which much of their social identity is inex-
tricably bound (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1985), as well
as by inducing a sense of shame and guilt by
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association1 and by damaging job security.
Harm to another stakeholder also indicates that
the organization is capable of similar conduct
toward its own employees.
Third, the failure is understood as having oc-
curred as a consequence of actions, or negligent
inaction, from organizational agents who have
acted as authorized, instructed, or otherwise fa-
cilitated by the organization. The locus of con-
trol for the failure is internal to the organization,
even though the context for the failure may in-
volve external influences.
To qualify as an organizational failure, each
condition is necessary but not sufficient, and
together they distinguish organization-level
failures from more minor transgressions. Even
when each condition is met, failures will vary in
magnitude, depending on the extent of each
condition: the harm caused may be hypothetical
(e.g., successful product recalls) or very real
(e.g., loss of life, jobs, or invested money), the
threat to legitimacy may be modest and short-
lived (e.g., the New York Times) or catastrophic
(e.g., WorldCom), and the organization may
have had total or partial control over the
(in)action leading to the failure.
For parsimony, our point of entry is postattri-
bution—that is, once the failure has occurred
and has damaged employees’ perceptions of or-
ganizational trustworthiness. While individual
employees may differ in their attributions and
perceptions, our assumption is that organiza-
tion-level failures are of a magnitude that dam-
ages most employees’ perceptions.
TRUST REPAIR: PRIOR THEORY AND
RESEARCH
Empirical studies on trust repair in organiza-
tional settings have examined the conditions
under which trust is broken and which remedial
activities are most effective in repairing the re-
lationship. Recommended actions include
Lewicki and Bunker’s (1996: 131–133) four-stage
process: (1) acknowledge that a violation has
occurred, (2) determine the causes of the viola-
tion and admit culpability, (3) admit the act was
destructive, and (4) accept responsibility for the
consequences. The transgressor should then en-
gage in action designed to undo the violation
and rebuild the trust. Tomlinson, Dineen, and
Lewicki (2004) similarly have urged violators to
always apologize and admit culpability where
relevant. However, this contradicts Kim, Ferrin,
Cooper, and Dirks’ (2004) finding that apologies
are more effective for competence-based viola-
tions, whereas denials are more effective for
violations of integrity.
Fewer studies have focused on substantive (as
opposed to verbal) actions. Bottom et al. (2002)
have reported that offers of penance elicit coop-
eration more effectively than verbal responses
alone, while Dirks, Kim, Cooper, and Ferrin
(2005) have reported that punishment and regu-
lation of the transgressor both effectively in-
crease trust following a violation. Nakayachi
and Watabe (2005) found that voluntarily intro-
ducing monitoring systems and sanctions
helped restore perceived organizational trust-
worthiness from the perspective of consumers.
Although this literature provides valuable in-
sights for interpersonal trust repair, its focus
and assumptions do not translate well to the
organizational level. First, studies focus primar-
ily on interpersonal trust between a single
violator and victim, yet, as we have argued,
perceived organizational trustworthiness is in-
fluenced by multiple sources of evidence and
actors operating at multiple organizational lev-
els. Second, experimental studies limit the
choice of remedial options, often to a unitary
verbal response (e.g., denial or apology). Follow-
ing an organization-level failure, a single re-
sponse will rarely be sufficient. Trust repair will
instead involve a protracted process requiring
several complementary responses at multiple
levels. Third, experimental studies minimize in-
put from beyond the immediate interaction. Typ-
ically, the victim has limited information about
the guilty party; the act and its aftermath are
private to the dyad, and the consequences of the
failure and decisions regarding reconciliation
are minimal and transient. These conditions do
not apply to organization-level failures; many
1 Schwartz and Gibb note that “when a company finds
itself pilloried by the press and/or its customers, the conse-
quences are real for both the organization and the individ-
uals involved” (1999: xiii). They cite incidents of Shell em-
ployees after the Ken Saro-Wiwa incident wrestling with
“the shock of finding themselves blamed for the tragedies—
even their children were being harassed at school” (1999: 28),
workers at Union Carbide “crying at their desks . . . in the
weeks after Bhopal” (1999: 170), and the CEO of Nike conced-
ing that part of the motivation for their code of conduct was
to make workers at Nike “feel better about ourselves”
(1999: 54).
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employees have extensive history and inside
information about the organization’s conduct,
and there are very real consequences for them
and the organization. The failure is often in full
public view, and external groups or forces may
influence the trust repair process. Finally, in
dyadic situations the transgressor knows what
caused the violation and what his or her role
was in making it happen. In contrast, blame and
responsibility typically are more diffuse in or-
ganizational failures, with multiple contribu-
tors. In summary, there is little theory or re-
search to guide trust repair at the organizational
level. We propose that a systemic, multilevel,
and multiactor framework is needed to guide
trust repair at this level.
A SYSTEMIC FRAMEWORK FOR
ORGANIZATION-LEVEL TRUST REPAIR
To understand organization-level trust repair,
we first need to identify what factors both influ-
ence employees’ assessment of the organiza-
tion’s (un)trustworthiness and contribute to or-
ganizational failures. To date, no coherent
theory or model exists to guide such an under-
standing. Our framework is informed by sys-
tems (Burke, 2002; Katz & Kahn, 1978) and multi-
level theories (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000;
Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999).
Systems theory depicts organizations as con-
verting external inputs (e.g., resources, invest-
ment, new recruits) into outputs (e.g., products
and services) via a “throughput” stage, which
comprises the organization’s entire operations
and activities. From this perspective, an organi-
zation-level failure results from faults in the
throughput, which damage the quality and sup-
ply of outputs and/or relations with input sup-
pliers (e.g., investors, customers, future employ-
ees) and, hence, the organization’s reputation
for trustworthiness (Burke, 2002: 47).
The throughput stage comprises multiple or-
ganizational system components. We focus on
six—four internal and two external (see Figure
1). Drawing from models of strategic change
(Burke & Litwin, 1992; Nadler & Tushman, 1997),
prominent internal components include leader-
ship and management practice; culture and cli-
mate; strategy; and structures, policies, and pro-
cesses. In turn, these components are influenced
by variables from the organization’s environ-
ment. Two external factors pertinent to under-
standing organizational trustworthiness are ex-
ternal governance and the organization’s public
reputation.
Both systems and multilevel theory highlight
that the organization’s various components op-
erate at multiple levels and that activities
within one component and level can influence
and be influenced by those occurring in other
components and levels (Rivkin & Siggelkow,
2003). Micro phenomena, such as perceptions of
organizational trustworthiness, are influenced
by macrolevel factors, while macro phenomena,
such as an organizational failure, often emerge
through the interactions of lower-level elements
(Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). Pertinent to our frame-
work is the view that an organization’s reputa-
tion for trustworthiness forms as a result of in-
teractions among agents and groups in a
multilevel network (e.g., senior leadership, line
management, employees in each work unit):
“Only through interaction does a construct ac-
quire meaning and structure” (Morgeson & Hof-
mann, 1999: 256). Through the influence of the
interconnected organizational components, cer-
tain interactions are facilitated and reinforced
and, if repeated regularly over time, form institu-
tionalized patterns of behavior and thinking
(“event cycles”; cf. Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999).
These provide the cumulative evidence for em-
ployees to judge their employer’s trustworthiness.
Thus, the organization does not display trustwor-
thiness—its members do, through interactions
and event cycles sanctioned by, and embedded in,
the organization’s system components.
Organizational Trustworthiness: Systemic
Contributors
Each subsection that follows supports our first
foundational premise that each of the six system
components identified in Figure 1 sends cues
about the organization’s ability, benevolence,
and integrity, and these cues influence, either
positively or negatively, employees’ perceived
organizational trustworthiness.
Leadership and management practice. An or-
ganization’s senior leaders and levels of man-
agement symbolize and shape the conduct of
the organization (Smircich & Morgan, 1982). By
virtue of their authority and accountability, se-
nior leaders’ actions directly inform employees’
impressions of the organization’s trustworthi-
ness (Kouzes & Posner, 2002). At the pivotal work
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unit level, an employee’s relationship with his
or her line manager often acts as a lens through
which the employee learns about and interprets
the rest of the organization. If employees dis-
trust their immediate manager, this taints their
perception of the broader organization’s trust-
worthiness (Kouzes & Posner, 2002). Through
their own behavior as role models (Schein, 1990)
and their influence and discretion over other
system components (e.g., rewards, appraisals,
cultural values), managers at all levels send
signals about what is expected of employees,
including whether untrustworthy or even uneth-
ical behaviors might be tolerated and even tac-
itly encouraged (see Dickson, Smith, Grojean, &
Ehrhart, 2001).
Culture and climate. Organizational culture,
subcultures, and work unit climates influence
the development of commonly held mental sche-
mata and employees’ shared interpretations of
organizational actions and events (Schein, 1990;
Victor & Cullen, 1988). Employees’ perceptions of
their organization’s trustworthiness can be de-
rived from shared cultural beliefs; values and
norms (Nooteboom, 2002); forms of cultural con-
trol (Das & Teng, 1998; Perrone, Zaheer, &
McEvily, 2003); and artifacts, such as work sto-
ries, legends, and value statements. Case stud-
ies attest to organizational and work unit norms
exerting strong pressure on employees to act in
untrustworthy ways, and even justifying ques-
tionable behavior (Dickson et al., 2001; Trevin˜o,
1986).
Strategy. Organizational strategy, including
financial, operational, and human resource
strategies, determine work unit goals, resources,
budgets, policies, and procedures, which, in
turn, send signals to employees about expected
behavior and the organization’s real values and
priorities (Burke & Litwin, 1992). The coherence
and effectiveness of the strategy can directly
affect interpretations of organizational com-
petence. The strategy also signals the organiza-
tion’s intention to act with integrity and benev-
olence toward its stakeholders. Several promi-
nent failures have involved questionable
strategies amounting to incompetent “over-
reach” (e.g., see Probst & Raisch, 2005: 92–94) or
disregard for certain stakeholders (e.g., cost cut-
FIGURE 1
Organizational System Components and Their Effects on Employees’ Perceptions of
Organizational Trustworthiness and Organization-Level Failures
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ting to the detriment of health and safety), each
of which undermines trustworthiness.
Structures, policies, and processes. By “struc-
tures,” we mean reporting lines, checks and bal-
ances, distribution of responsibility and author-
ity, and work formalization. By “policies and
processes,” we mean the rules, guidelines, and
procedures governing decision making, commu-
nication, employee conduct, and human re-
source management (HRM). Together, these set
parameters around acceptable behaviors and
can instill and even control members’ (un)trust-
worthiness by assigning roles and expectations
for incumbents and constraining discretionary
actions (Perrone et al., 2003; Shapiro, 1987). Con-
versely, absent, unclear, or unused arrange-
ments can facilitate or fail to prevent incompe-
tent and dishonest behavior. In this manner
structures, policies, and processes can powerfully
influence organizational trustworthiness. The fair-
ness and consistency of structures, policies, and
processes, both in design and implementation,
are indicative of benevolence and integrity, while
coherence and effectiveness imply ability. HRM
policies in particular have been shown to influ-
ence employees’ perceptions of organizational
trustworthiness (see Mayer & Davis, 1999).
External governance. In addition to these in-
ternal components, expectations of what consti-
tutes trustworthy behavior are embedded within
external governing structures and rules that
constrain the organization’s conduct. Forms of
institutional-based trust (Zucker, 1986) include
legislation and regulatory mechanisms from
government, professional and trade associa-
tions, industry networks (Ring & Van de Ven,
1992), and, increasingly, consumer and environ-
mental bodies. To the extent that these “imper-
sonal structures” are trusted, they can provide a
basis for trust in the organization by proxy (Mc-
Knight et al., 1998: 474). However, as Arthur
Andersen’s collusion with the Enron fraud high-
lights, the institutional environment may lack
adequate constraining mechanisms or may con-
tain opportunities and even incentives for par-
ties to engage in untrustworthy activities.
Public reputation. Finally, employees also
take cues from how their organization’s reputa-
tion for ability, benevolence, and integrity is
perceived by external stakeholders (e.g., by cus-
tomers, industry representatives, the media).
Cues come from judgments about the organiza-
tion’s products and services, the familiarity of its
brand, and its standing among industry and
stakeholder networks (Klein, 1997). Employees
take pride in, and are reassured by, a stable
external reputation for trustworthiness (Shaw &
Post, 1993), whereas public dismay over poor-
quality goods or services or inappropriate
treatment of stakeholders will undermine em-
ployees’ perceptions of their organization’s
trustworthiness.
We anticipate that the salience of each com-
ponent for employees’ perceptions will vary
across organizations and sectors, as well as
among employees. Our essential point here is
that each component communicates cues that,
in the aggregate, form the collective construct of
perceived organizational trustworthiness. This
leads to our first foundational premise.
Premise 1: Employees’ perceptions of
organizational trustworthiness are in-
fluenced by multiple cues from the or-
ganization’s six system components:
leadership and management practice;
culture and climate; strategy; struc-
tures, policies, and processes; external
governance; and public reputation.
Organizational Failures: Systemic Contributors
As illustrated in the previous subsections,
each component can engender organizational
trustworthiness but can also facilitate untrust-
worthy behavior, which increases the likelihood
of an organizational failure. Our second founda-
tional premise is that multiple organizational
components and agents contribute to the dys-
functional interactions and event cycles that re-
sult in organizational failures: “Unethical or il-
legal actions cannot take place without
opportunity” (O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gil-
ley, 2006: 486)—nor, we suggest, can incompe-
tence or avoidable accidents. Even when an in-
dividual’s lone actions seem to have caused the
failure (e.g., Nick Leeson’s risky trading “single-
handedly” destroying Barings Bank), these ac-
tions are typically facilitated by a deviant or
inadequate culture, strategy, or management
and/or by ineffective constraining structures,
policies, and processes (all of the above in Lee-
son’s case). We do not anticipate that every com-
ponent will be implicated; rather, failures of a
magnitude that threaten the organization’s le-
gitimacy will have multiple contributory causes.
132 JanuaryAcademy of Management Review
This premise is supported by systems and multi-
level theory and by research and case studies
on organizational failures and crises (see Hauns-
child & Sullivan, 2002; O’Connor et al., 2006;
Pearson & Clair, 1998; Rivkin & Siggelkow,
2003).2
We distinguish the role of internal and exter-
nal system components in organizational fail-
ures. While every organization is constrained by
external governance structures (or enabled by
their absence or incentives therein), organiza-
tional members nevertheless retain consider-
able discretion over how they respond (Katz &
Kahn, 1978), including whether they act in a
trustworthy manner or not. As the equifinality
principle (Gresov & Drazin, 1997) states, alterna-
tive strategies exist for how organizations re-
spond to the same circumstances and, hence,
how they choose to coordinate the system com-
ponents. Not all firms in a sector “fail,” although
all face the same difficult external factors. Thus,
only the internal components contribute directly
to organization-level failures (see Figure 1).
Premise 2: Organization-level failures
are systemic in nature, yet only the
multiple internal organizational com-
ponents contribute directly to organi-
zation-level failures.
PRINCIPLES FOR REPAIRING
ORGANIZATIONAL TRUSTWORTHINESS
The two preceding premises are foundational
since they provide an understanding of the sys-
temic construction of perceived organizational
trustworthiness and the systemic factors contrib-
uting to organizational failures that need
consideration in designing trust repair interven-
tions. We now describe two underlying mecha-
nisms for trust repair and the principle of con-
gruence, and we illustrate how these operate
through each system component. Because our
entry point is postattribution, we focus on trust
repair strategies that deal with the aftermath of
the failure, rather than attempts to reposition
perceptions of the failure itself.
Underlying Mechanisms for Trust Repair
People undergo a cognitive reappraisal of the
relationship following a trust failure, with a ten-
dency to privilege negative evidence over posi-
tive evidence (Kim et al., 2004; Slovic, 1993). Dur-
ing this fragile period, people are strongly
motivated to avoid risk, are “hypervigilant” to
suggestions of future untrustworthy behavior,
and are susceptible to “paranoid cognitions”
and “sinister attribution error” (Kramer, 1996).
These cognitive biases can lead to overcon-
strued and negative inferences about the mo-
tives, character, and competence of the organi-
zation and its management, impeding accurate
sensemaking and learning about the failure
(Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002) and hampering
trust repair efforts. Thus, the primary objectives
of any trust repair process are to overcome these
salient negative expectations and to restore
confident positive expectations about the viola-
tor’s future trustworthiness (Kim et al., 2004). We
draw on the distinction between trust and dis-
trust (see Lewicki et al., 1998) to identify two
complementary mechanisms that underlie orga-
nization-level trust repair: distrust regulation
and trustworthiness demonstration.
Distrust regulation. This mechanism attempts
to overcome employees’ distrust—the confident
negative expectations (cf. Lewicki et al., 1998)
and “expectation of injurious action” (Luhmann,
1979: 72)—arising from the failure. It does so
through actions designed to avoid and prevent
future trust transgressions, by dealing with the
faults that led to the failure—both direct and
contributory. If these faults remain in place, the
likelihood of a recurrence is high, and this po-
tentiality will further undermine employees’
confidence. Trust repair is much more difficult
after repeated violations than after an initial
failure (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).
2 The investigation into the Space Shuttle Columbia di-
saster (CAIB, 2003) identified as contributory causes NASA’s
culture (which diminished safety), management practices
(which prevented communication), an inappropriate chain of
command, resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, and
scheduling pressures. BP’s 2005 Texas City refinery fire was
initially attributed to mistakes by individual employees, but
the official investigation revealed complex interconnected
causes, including management lapses; unclear responsibil-
ities and accountabilities; lack of training; inadequate
maintenance; poor communication, reward, and perfor-
mance management processes; and a “fragmented culture”
characterized by “resistance to change” and “distrust.” The
report into the Enron collapse concluded that it was “the
result of failures at many levels and by many people,” iden-
tifying among the key contributors financial incentives, con-
flicts of interest, inadequate controls, and a “culture [that]
appears to have encouraged ’pushing the limits”’ (Powers,
Troubh, & Winokur, 2002: 27–28).
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Distrust regulation interventions are designed
to modify the organization’s dysfunctional compo-
nents and errant interactions and event cycles
that contributed to the failure, replacing themwith
a new “admissible range” of behaviors. This
mechanism involves implementing sufficient reg-
ulatory controls to prevent or constrain organiza-
tional members and groups from acting in ways
that could lead to future violations, including the
removal of incentives thatmay encourage untrust-
worthy behavior. This reflects Nooteboom’s obser-
vation (2002) that organizational trustworthiness is
founded largely on an organization’s ability to fos-
ter and control its members’ trustworthiness. The
aim is to reduce and eventually dissipate fears
and skepticism about the organization’s intention
and ability to avoid future transgressions.
These “legalistic remedies” (Sitkin & Roth,
1993) include regulations, rules, contracts, mon-
itoring processes, and controls. Embedded in
these approaches are deterrents in the form of
punishments and sanctions imposed on those
who engage in untrustworthy behavior (e.g., be-
ing fined, fired, demoted, or ostracized, or losing
accreditation, privileges, membership, status, or
social capital). The presence of such punish-
ment sends clear signals that the behavior is
unacceptable and offenders will “pay a price.”
Research suggests that these regulatory sys-
tems can significantly enhance and repair per-
ceived organizational trustworthiness (Sitkin &
Roth, 1993; Slovic, 1993), particularly when intro-
duced voluntarily rather than imposed exter-
nally (Dirks et al., 2005; Nakayachi & Watabe,
2005). When regulations are imposed (e.g., by the
government), compliance may be attributed to
the desire to avoid sanctions, raising concerns
that the organization may get around or weaken
the constraints. In contrast, a voluntary effort
will be seen as diagnostic of the organization
itself (Heider, 1958), implying that it has learned
a lesson and is intrinsically committed to, and
confident in its ability to, act differently (Na-
kayachi & Watabe, 2005).
Proposition 1a: After an organization-
al failure, the voluntary implemen-
tation of interventions that constrain
untrustworthy behavior by organiza-
tional agents increases employees’
perceptions of the organization’s
trustworthiness.
We anticipate that employees will accept the
legitimate need for the organization to impose
regulations on itself and its agents in order to
prevent future failures. The magnitude of the
organization-level failure provides a clear and
powerful motivation.
Trustworthiness demonstration. Overcoming
negative expectations and distrust is essential to
trust repair, but it does not go far enough. As
Lewicki et al. argue, “Removal of foundations of
distrust . . . does not necessarily facilitate the
emergence of trust” (1998: 452). It is also necessary
to restore positive expectations (Kim et al., 2004)
and a sense of good faith and fair dealing (Rous-
seau et al., 1998). This second mechanism, trust-
worthiness demonstration, is about the positive
promotion of renewed trustworthiness through be-
haviors and verbal responses that actively dem-
onstrate ability, benevolence, and integrity. It is
focused on sending repeated, clear, and consis-
tent signals that employees can anticipate bene-
ficial conduct and desirable actions from the or-
ganization, resulting in a sense of hope, faith, and
assurance (Lewicki et al., 1998: 444–445).
This mechanism includes expressions of re-
gret, acknowledgment of responsibility, apolo-
gies, and offers of reparations, as well as gen-
eral displays of competence, benevolence, and
integrity in the organization’s initial and ongo-
ing response to the failure (e.g., meeting new
commitments). Hence, this mechanism is dis-
tinct from distrust regulation, since it focuses
on symbolic and actual displays of positive
trustworthiness, rather than on regulating
negative behavior related to the cause of the
failure (e.g., apologizing and offering repara-
tions demonstrates benevolence and fairness
but does not directly prevent a future trans-
gression). This mechanism is complementary
to distrust regulation, since repeated and/or
enduring displays of such positive signals
over time help restore employees’ confidence
in the organization.
Proposition 1b: After an organization-
al failure, the implementation of inter-
ventions that demonstrate and sym-
bolize the organization’s ability,
benevolence, and integrity increases
employees’ perceptions of the organi-
zation’s trustworthiness.
Table 1 provides illustrative examples of how
the distrust regulation and trustworthiness dem-
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onstration mechanisms can operate through
each organizational system component.
The Principle of Congruence
Because multiple organizational components
contribute to both perceived organizational
trustworthiness (Premise 1) and organization-
level failure (Premise 2), trust repair requires
that the “signals” emanating from the different
components reinforce, not undermine, renewed
trustworthiness. Given employees’ likely hyper-
vigilance and paranoia, any further transgres-
sions, lapses, or inconsistencies, however mi-
nor, can significantly impair the fragile trust
repair effort. Isolated interventions to only one
TABLE 1
Examples of Trust Repair Interventions for Each Organizational System Component
Component
Distrust Regulation: Constrain Untrustworthy
Behavior
Trustworthiness Demonstration: Signal Renewed
Trustworthiness
Leadership and
management
practice
● Suspend operations and/or withdraw faulty
product(s)
● Reprimand, discipline, or remove culpable
parties
● Investigate practices, conduct, and attitudes
● Ensure enactment and compliance of reforms;
influence other system components to
regulate trustworthiness (e.g., change
incentives and reporting structures)
● Enact transformational leadership: act as a role
model, symbolizing organizational values and
conduct; create a shared, value-driven vision and
goals
● Issue trust-enhancing communications
● Enhance the trustworthiness of other system
components (e.g., procedural fairness, ethical
strategic goals and implementation)
● Commit resources to trust repair effort (e.g., money,
time, manpower)
Culture and
climate
● Use cultural interventions (e.g., induction,
socialization) to instill values and norms that
discourage trust violations
● Impose sanctions for breaches of trust-related
norms
● Create “cultural artifacts” that act as
deterrents (e.g., ethical codes of conduct,
public statements)
● Use cultural interventions to instill values and
norms around integrity, honesty, competence,
responsibility, reliability, and respect
● Create “cultural artifacts” that symbolize and
promote trustworthiness and affirm its priority over
competing imperatives (e.g., codes of conduct,
commemorative events, legends and stories)
Strategy ● Shape organizational and unit-level priorities
and goals (e.g., primacy of safety and
integrity), resource allocations, and the
content of policies and procedures
● Direct behavior in line with organizational
strategies
● Revise strategy to be consistent with espoused
trust-based values
● Reform strategy to show an enduring commitment to
treat stakeholders benevolently and with integrity
● Promote ethical conduct and corporate social
responsibility
Structures,
policies, and
processes
● Revise decision-making authority and
accountability
● Impose checks, balances, and disciplinary
procedures
● Standardize work processes and training to
compensate for lack of skills and/or
knowledge
● Offer coaching and mentoring to assist
employees facing ethical dilemmas or
difficult decisions
● Revise policies and procedures to ensure employees
perceive them to be fair, effective, and just (e.g.,
transparent and equitable appraisal systems,
dispute resolution and whistleblowing procedures).
● Use recruitment, selection, induction, and training
procedures, emphasizing personal integrity and or-
ganizational values symbolizing trustworthiness
External
governance
● Comply with external regulatory codes of
conduct and monitoring (e.g., professional,
industry, consumer)
● Gain external accreditation, licensing,
approval, or audit
● Voluntarily engage with external regulatory bodies
● Seek licensing/accreditation (e.g., SA8000 on ethical
conduct)
● Campaign government for sector-wide regulations
Public
reputation
● Make public statements committing the
organization to uphold reformed strategies,
operations, and targets
● Internally publish the diagnosis, evaluations,
and audits
● Use trust-enhancing communications, marketing,
and branding
● Offer public apologies and reparations (where
appropriate)
● Voluntarily communicate to the public the diagnosis
and evaluations
2009 135Gillespie and Dietz
component are unlikely, therefore, to provide
sufficient evidence to convince employees that a
predictable and sustainable difference in orga-
nizational trustworthiness has been realized.
Rather, a coordinated set of interventions across
the multiple components contributing to the fail-
ure will be required. In line with systems think-
ing, we propose that congruence is key to effec-
tive trust repair.
We define congruence as the degree to which
signals emanating from each component are
consistent together in demonstrating cues of re-
newed organizational trustworthiness and in
preventing future untrustworthy behavior. For
example, interventions emphasizing ethical
codes of conduct during socialization and train-
ing activities are unlikely to change behavior if
workplace norms encourage questionable be-
havior and performance management practices
focus solely on target achievement at any cost.
Since a lack of trustworthiness in just one com-
ponent may undermine employees’ confidence,
we do not see interventions across different
components as playing a strictly additive or in-
cremental role. Rather, a level of congruence
must be achieved before an appreciable in-
crease in organizational trustworthiness can be
realized. This echoes the idea of alignment
among interdependent organizational elements
(see Siggelkow, 2002) and of “internal fit” from
strategic HRM (Wood, 1999). Congruence is
achieved when the organizational components
are realigned into an internally coherent config-
uration that consistently signals reasonable
standards of ability, benevolence, and integrity,
with no contradictory signals or competing im-
peratives elsewhere in the system. Just as be-
havioral integrity—the alignment of leaders’
words and actions (Simons, 2002)—has been
shown to be central to interpersonal trust and
credibility (Kouzes & Posner, 2002), congruence
is pivotal to effective organizational trust repair.
Proposition 2: The effectiveness of
trust repair interventions is moderated
by the extent to which they achieve
congruence across organizational
components in (a) constraining
untrustworthy behavior by organiza-
tional agents and (b) demonstrating
the organization’s trustworthiness.
The greater the congruence, the stron-
ger the impact of the interventions on
employees’ perceptions of the organi-
zation’s trustworthiness will be.
Implicit in our use of the two underlying
mechanisms is the need to regulate distrust and
demonstrate trustworthiness across each of the
three dimensions of ability, benevolence, and
integrity. This has merit since organizational
failures often involve faults in multiple dimen-
sions of trustworthiness. For example, investi-
gations into the 1987 Zeebrugge ferry sinking
and into the NASA Space Shuttle disasters re-
vealed that these resulted not only from a lack of
competence but also from a disregard for safety.
Employees’ interpretations of failures may also
differ from one another and may not settle on a
single dimension; evidence of failure across all
three dimensions may be evoked, albeit to vary-
ing degrees. Controlled laboratory studies that
have deliberately manipulated only one type of
violation (e.g., ability or integrity) have shown
that perceived trustworthiness in the other di-
mension also declines (Dirks et al., 2005; Kim et
al., 2004). Furthermore, employees’ hypervigi-
lance in response to a failure is likely to apply
across all three dimensions.
While violations in one dimension may
contaminate perceptions in another, it does not
follow that the repair of one dimension neces-
sarily will enhance perceptions of other dimen-
sions. This view is supported by research indi-
cating that, after a trust violation, people pay
more attention and attribute more significance
to negative than positive evidence (Slovic, 1993)
and that individuals tend to weigh positive in-
formation more heavily than negative informa-
tion when evaluating ability but tend to weigh
negative information more heavily than positive
information when evaluating integrity (Kim et
al., 2004: 107–108; Snyder & Stukas, 1999). Conse-
quently, it is unlikely that positive new evidence
in one dimension will transfer to other dimen-
sions. As we elaborate later (see Propositions 7a
and 7b), this suggests that different types of
interventions are required to repair different as-
pects of trustworthiness. Hence, interventions
addressing only one dimension will be inade-
quate to restore a robust reputation of trustwor-
thiness.
Proposition 3: The effectiveness of
trust repair interventions is moderated
by the extent to which they address
each of the three dimensions of trust-
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worthiness, rather than just one di-
mension. The more multiple dimen-
sions are addressed, the stronger the
impact of the interventions on employ-
ees’ perceptions of the organization’s
trustworthiness will be.
A PROCESS FOR REPAIRING
ORGANIZATIONAL TRUSTWORTHINESS
In this section we argue that robust, organiza-
tion-level trust repair involves a four-stage pro-
cess (see Figure 2). The stages are informed by
the trust and strategic change management lit-
erature (Burke & Litwin, 1992; Lewicki & Bunker,
1996) and systems and multilevel theory, as well
as analysis of case study accounts of responses
to failures. We describe the aims, rationale, and
propositions for each stage and show how dis-
trust regulation and trustworthiness demonstra-
tion underlie trust repair actions.
Stage 1: Immediate Responses
A critical and urgent step for organizational
representatives is an initial communication to
employees and affected stakeholders about the
failure. As the organization’s first attempt to re-
establish its reputation, this response needs to
be well considered, timely, and credible.
Research suggests that the choice and se-
quence of verbal responses impact trust repair.
From the range of available options, we do not
see denying the failure has happened or excus-
ing the organization as credible responses. In
the context of organizational failures, responsi-
bility lies by definition at least in part with the
organization, and duplicitous impression man-
agement has been found to be ineffective (Bot-
tom et al., 2002) and unsustainable in the face of
evidence of guilt (Kim et al., 2004). Rather, an
overarching standard for our trust repair pro-
cess is accuracy and transparency (Korsgaard et
al., 2002).
We propose that senior leaders’ first commu-
nication requires an acknowledgment that the
failure has occurred and an expression of sin-
cere regret for the consequences. Research sug-
gests these verbal responses aid forgiveness
and trust repair (Bottom et al., 2002). Committing
to a full investigation into the causes of the
failure and to measures to prevent future reoc-
currences is also essential. Together, these re-
sponses reassure employees, and they signal
the organization’s concern for stakeholders (be-
nevolence), commitment to understanding how
FIGURE 2
Propositions for the Principles and Four-Stage Process of Organization-Level Trust Repair
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the violation occurred (integrity), and ability to
avoid a reoccurrence. Not offering any commu-
nication conveys a lack of concern and integrity,
as well as incompetence. Such “reticence” has
proven ineffective for trust repair (Ferrin, Kim,
Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). For example, Exxon’s “no
comment” stance immediately after the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill alienated employees,
communities, and the media, damaging its cred-
ibility further.
Subsequent communications will be required
to convey the causes of the failure, the organi-
zation’s full remedial response, and, where ap-
propriate, an apology and offer of reparations.
However, rarely are the precise direct and indi-
rect causes immediately known (see Premise 2),
and a full diagnosis is likely to take consider-
able time. Therefore, we suggest that such com-
munications are not made until the diagnostic
investigation is complete (see Stage 3), to avoid
premature and possibly inaccurate conclusions,
inappropriate blame, and ineffective responses
that may undermine trustworthiness further and
leave the organization more vulnerable to legal
action and public condemnation.
Proposition 4a: A timely initial com-
munication acknowledging the occur-
rence of the failure, expressing
sincere regret for the (potential) con-
sequences, and announcing a full
investigation and commitment to pre-
vent future reoccurrences will posi-
tively impact employees’ perceptions
of the organization’s trustworthiness.
With the announcement of the diagnostic in-
vestigation, immediate interventions are re-
quired to rectify any causes of the failure that
can be established confidently prior to the diag-
nosis and that continue to pose a risk to stake-
holders (distrust regulation). Inaction in the face
of this awareness will be highly damaging to
the organization’s reputation, signaling incom-
petence, questionable integrity, and even ma-
levolent intent, whereas swift interventions will
communicate the organization’s commitment to
restoring its reputation (trustworthiness demon-
stration). Examples include suspending those
people directly implicated, closing down or lim-
iting operations, withdrawing goods, and warn-
ing stakeholders of the problem. Given the short
time frame, we expect these efforts to focus on
two internal components: (1) leadership and
management and (2) structures, policies, and
processes. In contrast to the other components,
these are more amenable to rapid changes and
interventions (see Burke & Litwin, 1992).
Proposition 4b: Timely, initial inter-
ventions that prevent or constrain a
reoccurrence of the failure will posi-
tively impact employees’ perceived or-
ganizational trustworthiness.
Stage 2: Diagnosis
The aim of the diagnosis is to systematically
identify what contributed to the failure and
what needs to change so as to prevent similar
incidents in the future, as well as any other
actions required to restore trust. We propose
that the effectiveness of the diagnosis for trust
repair will be influenced by three qualities: ac-
curacy, transparency, and timeliness.
Accuracy and transparency. The perceived
adequacy of explanations is key to overcoming
negative reactions. Any diagnostic account
must provide “sufficient substance . . . to be be-
lievable” and match in its scope the magnitude
of the offence (Bottom et al., 2002: 499). In
line with Premise 2 and our principle of congru-
ence, an accurate diagnosis requires system-
wide scope, extending beyond those agents and
components that appear most directly associ-
ated with the failure to explore the role played
by each component in enabling and facilitating,
or failing to prevent, the failure. A partial diag-
nosis may result in ineffective attempts to repair
trust. Accessing the accounts and tacit knowl-
edge of a representative cross-section of organi-
zational members about dysfunctional organiza-
tional components will help to reduce bias and
enhance diagnostic accuracy.
Diagnostic processes can be manipulated,
however. Organizations may try to keep their
involvement in questionable practices covert, to
recast the failure and damage in a more benign
light (Greenberg, 1990), or to isolate blame to a
contained source (“scapegoats”). However, such
“cheap talk” is rarely sufficient (Bottom et al.,
2002), and dishonest tactics can backfire (Kim et
al., 2004; Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher,
2001). Apart from the lack of integrity in present-
ing a dishonest or inaccurate diagnosis, doing
so is risky because some employees will have
insider status, networks, and/or knowledge giv-
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ing them substantial evidence on which to judge
the failure’s real causes. They may expose inac-
curacies, cover-ups, and whether the potential
for repeat failures remains to colleagues and
wider networks (whistleblowing; see Miceli &
Near, 1985), engendering cynicism and hamper-
ing the repair effort.
The effects of making the diagnostic findings
transparent are currently underexplored. Full
disclosure enables the accuracy of the diagno-
sis to be evaluated, which, if accepted, provides
a shared understanding of the causes of the
failure and recommended reforms, enabling all
organizational members to consciously avoid
and constrain the conditions contributing to the
failure. Without such information employees
will not know the rationale for the interventions
and will likely be uncommitted to them. Hence,
a transparent diagnosis facilitates distrust reg-
ulation. The effects of transparency on trustwor-
thiness demonstration, however, are more com-
plex. Paradoxically, full and frank disclosure of
the organization’s faults may damage employ-
ees’ trustworthiness perceptions further in the
short term, especially if failures of benevolence
or integrity are implicated (cf. Snyder & Stukas,
1999). Yet not disclosing the findings and evi-
dence supporting them is likely to have an even
more deleterious effect, suggesting the organi-
zation has something to hide and has not
learned from the failure. Adverse reactions are
likely, given employees’ hypervigilant state.
Moreover, we anticipate that when disclosure is
enacted voluntarily for the purpose of organiza-
tional learning (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002)
and to prevent future violations, the positive
signals this sends about the organization’s in-
tegrity and benevolence (Nakayachi & Watabe,
2005) will counteract any potentially damaging
effects from the content of the findings.
Proposition 5a: The impact of the diag-
nosis on employees’ perceptions of the
organization’s trustworthiness is mod-
erated by its accuracy and transpar-
ency. When both accuracy and trans-
parency are high, the diagnosis will
positively affect perceived organiza-
tional trustworthiness; when either is
low, there will be a negative effect.
Timeliness. As argued in Stage 1, a rushed
diagnosis does little to enhance, but rather may
damage, employees’ perceptions of trustworthi-
ness. However, as stakeholders’ patience
quickly wears thin, the diagnosis needs to be
conducted and reported as soon as is practical.
A timely diagnosis is also important for ensur-
ing accuracy, since information, people, and
other sources of “evidence” become less reliable
and accessible over time.
A sense of urgency also demonstrates the or-
ganization’s concern to prevent future transgres-
sions and its ability to respond effectively. A
slow response signals incompetence and a lack
of benevolence for those affected, and it enables
system faults to fester unnecessarily, increasing
the risk of future trust transgressions. Further-
more, in the absence of an explanatory diagno-
sis, employees will rely on subjective interpre-
tations and rumors to make sense of the failure
(Kramer, 1996).
Given research suggesting that third parties
tend to amplify and accentuate negative over
positive information (Burt & Knez, 1996), counter-
ing the inevitable rumor machine with a timely
diagnosis is vital for trust repair. Interim diag-
nostic reports summarizing verifiable prelimi-
nary findings can help in this regard. In sum-
mary, we argue for a curvilinear effect for
timeliness on employees’ perceived organiza-
tional trustworthiness.
Proposition 5b: The timeliness of the
diagnosis has a curvilinear relation-
ship with employees’ perceived orga-
nizational trustworthiness. A prema-
ture or too slow diagnosis will be
associated with low trustworthiness,
whereas a timely diagnosis will be
associated with high trustworthi-
ness.
Stage 3: Reforming Interventions
The diagnostic information provides the foun-
dation to devise and plan reforming interven-
tions, including which organizational compo-
nents to target. Examples of trust-enhancing
interventions for each component and underly-
ing mechanism are given in Table 1. In this
section we first discuss the communications re-
quired postdiagnosis. We then consider how the
relative effectiveness of the two trust repair
mechanisms (distrust regulation and trustwor-
thiness demonstration) depend on the dimen-
sion of trustworthiness targeted.
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Communication postdiagnosis. Where the di-
agnosis reveals organizational responsibility,
apologies (i.e., acknowledgement of responsibil-
ity and guilt) and offers of reparations to af-
fected stakeholders (i.e., forms of penance) can
substantially aid trust repair (Bottom et al., 2002;
Kim et al., 2004; Tomlinson et al., 2004). However,
organizations often face legal, commercial,
and/or shareholder pressures to “save face” and
“never admit culpability,” potentially closing off
these conciliatory remedial responses in the
minds of management. Yet apologies are a pre-
requisite for reconciliation (Lewicki & Bunker,
1996), and taking responsibility for the conse-
quences of its actions in the face of such reper-
cussions strongly indicates an organization’s
integrity and concern for those affected (Kors-
gaard et al., 2002). For example, BP’s decision to
admit responsibility for the 2005 Texas City fire
and to compensate bereaved families was her-
alded as “very brave” by industry commentators
(The Guardian, 2005). These responses also sig-
nal a commitment to prevent future violations,
whereas avoidance of responsibility and rea-
sonable compensatory actions may damage
trustworthiness still further, particularly if legal
battles and/or public condemnation ensues.3
Apologies will be most effective when an
internal versus external attribution of responsi-
bility is used (Kim, Dirks Cooper, & Ferrin 2006;
Tomlinson et al., 2004), with the sincerity of ac-
knowledging direct responsibility (internal attri-
bution) outweighing the negative implications
from conceded guilt. In contrast, alternative re-
sponses—excuses, reticence, or citing external
attributions—will be viewed as deceptive and
will therefore be less effective (Schlenker et al.,
2001), given the diagnostic evidence of the orga-
nization’s partial or full responsibility for the
failure, coupled with employees’ “insider knowl-
edge.”
Proposition 6: Following the diagnosis
of an organizational failure, (a) an
apology with internal attribution will
be more effective than no apology or
an apology with external attribution,
and (b) offers of reparations to affected
stakeholders will be more effective
than no offers of reparations in restor-
ing employees’ perceived organiza-
tional trustworthiness.
Trust repair mechanisms. To reiterate, indi-
viduals tend to weigh positive information more
heavily than negative information when related
to ability, but negative information more heavily
than positive information when related to integ-
rity (Snyder & Stukas, 1999). Reeder and Brewer’s
(1979) notion of “hierarchically restricted
schema” suggests this is because the “scope of
infection” differs for failures of ability versus
failures of integrity. After an ability violation,
positive demonstrations of competence will re-
duce the likelihood the violation will be seen as
a reliable indicator of incompetence, because
people believe intuitively that those with com-
petence can exhibit performance at a variety of
levels, whereas those who are incompetent can-
not (Kim et al., 2004). In contrast, failures of in-
tegrity or, we suggest, benevolence are inher-
ently moral in nature and tend to be viewed as
reflecting grievous and enduring deficiencies of
character that can be generalizable to other cir-
cumstances in the future (Kim et al., 2004). After
an integrity or benevolence failure, a positive
display of these qualities is likely to be dis-
counted as a signal of renewed trustworthiness,
given that those both with and without integrity
and benevolence can “display” honesty and
concern in certain situations. Consequently,
these failures will be more difficult to remedy on
the basis of positive trustworthiness demonstra-
tion. Interventions designed to constrain future
malevolent behavior (distrust regulation) will be
more convincing and effective. Hence, while
both mechanisms are important for trust repair,
we propose the following.
Proposition 7a: Trustworthiness dem-
onstration mechanisms will be more
effective for repairing employees’ per-
ceptions of organizational trustworthi-
ness after an ability failure than after
integrity or benevolence failures.
Proposition 7b: Distrust regulation
mechanisms will be more effective for
repairingemployees’ perceptionsof or-
ganizational trustworthiness after in-
3 The reputation of Union Carbide (now part of Dow
Chemical) remains besmirched two decades after the Bho-
pal chemical leak, largely because of the company’s failure
to effectively apologize and offer fair penance in the eyes of
victim groups and much of the public. The incident remains
the subject of class action in New York City courts.
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tegrity and benevolence failures than
after an ability failure.
Stage 4: Evaluation
Evaluations assessing the progress and effec-
tiveness of the interventions function as a dis-
trust regulation mechanism, identifying any
persistent problem areas in the organization’s
defense against future violations. They provide
ongoing diagnostic data to refine and embed
reforming interventions and, importantly,
achieve congruence in the trust-related signals
emanating from the multiple organizational
components. Given the difficulty of achieving
congruence and repairing trust system-wide,
successive cycles of evaluation followed by re-
forming interventions are likely to be required.
By institutionalizing the measurement of trust
levels, regular evaluations maintain attention
and effort on the trust repair process, enhancing
its effectiveness and sustainability over time.
We do not consider an evaluation to be es-
sential for trust repair, since restoring per-
ceived organizational trustworthiness is pos-
sible without an evaluation. Rather, an
evaluation will augment the effectiveness of
trust repair efforts and will strengthen per-
ceived organizational trustworthiness. If the
evaluation stage is skipped, it will be difficult
to know how effective the repair efforts have
been, and outstanding problems in the orga-
nizational system that damage organizational
trustworthiness will not be detected and,
hence, will remain unresolved.
Similar to the diagnosis, an effective evalu-
ation needs to be accurate, systemic, multi-
level, timely, and transparent. With these
qualities, the act of conducting evaluations,
feeding back results, and implementing fur-
ther reforms based on the results signals abil-
ity (i.e., due diligence), benevolence (i.e., seek-
ing input and reinforcing concern to rebuild
relationships), and integrity (i.e., openness,
honesty, and ensuring commitments are ful-
filled). In this respect, evaluations function
also as a trustworthiness demonstration
mechanism.
Proposition 8: Evaluating the effec-
tiveness of the reforming interventions
and acting on the results will enhance
employees’ perceived organizational
trustworthiness.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE
Despite the frequency of organizational fail-
ures reported in the media, to our knowledge,
this is the first paper to provide managers and
consultants faced with the formidable challenge
of restoring employees’ trust after a failure with
a framework of principles, underlying mecha-
nisms, and a recommended process to guide
organizational trust repair.
Our framework highlights a number of dilem-
mas inherent in the trust repair process, which
deserve further attention. One is the tension be-
tween the need for a “speedy response” and the
time required to ensure “due process.” Prioritiz-
ing speed risks not appreciating all factors con-
tributing to the failure, resulting in superficial
actions that tackle symptoms but not the
cause(s). Yet too slow of a response is likely to
engender frustration and cynicism and risks
leaving the causes of the failure “live.” The
timeliness of the interventions may, therefore,
influence perceived trustworthiness in a curvi-
linear fashion (similar to Proposition 5b). Stage 1
of our trust repair process aims to balance both
requirements. Future research is needed to ex-
plore the relative effectiveness of strategies for
managing this tension and the factors that in-
fluence the perceived timeliness of responses
(e.g., Do interim reports help? Should interven-
tions first target the organizational components
most amenable to change?).
A second consideration is the cost-benefit
analysis of full trust repair versus a more lim-
ited response. While we have argued for the
necessity and merits of a comprehensive ap-
proach, this is not without potential costs and
risks. A systemic diagnosis and set of interven-
tions involves substantial time, effort, and re-
sources and may require widespread adapta-
tion to organizational components to achieve
congruence. This diversion of resources may im-
pede the organization’s competence in other ar-
eas. A transparent “warts and all” diagnosis
may further damage the organization’s internal
and external reputation for trustworthiness, at
least in the short term. Research is required to
explore this potential paradoxical effect and
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whether it is ameliorated by a voluntary diag-
nosis, as we suggest.
Where the organizational failure results in
harm to other stakeholders, an implication of
our framework is that restoring employees’ per-
ceptions of trustworthiness requires reparative
actions toward other affected stakeholders. This
raises the challenge of balancing the poten-
tially incompatible concerns, needs, and expec-
tations of employees with those of customers,
investors, and regulators. To what extent and
under what circumstances, therefore, is repara-
tive action toward other stakeholders pivotal to
repairing employees’ trust?
We confine our discussion of the interconnect-
edness of the organizational components to the
conceptual level, proposing that a systemic,
multilevel approach, coupled with the principle
of congruence, is central to effective trust repair.
Further research is required to understand the
specific interactions and interdependencies
among the six components and how these influ-
ence trust repair. Following Klein and Kozlowski
(2000: 20–21), are interventions to components
“proximal” to the direct experience of employ-
ees (e.g., structures, policies, and processes;
work unit management practice and climate)
more effective than interventions to more “dis-
tal” components (e.g., cultural change, revised
strategies, new senior leadership)? Or is prox-
imity to the failure—addressing the most appar-
ent causes and components—more important?
How might the influence of each component dif-
fer across organizations and for employees in
different roles, levels, and locations?
Our framework assumes that employees’
perceptions of organizational trustworthiness
are damaged by the failure. However, this may
not be a universal response (Schwartz & Gibb,
1999: 37). Research is required to investigate
perceptions of organizational failures and
what explains different reactions. To opera-
tionalize organization-level failures, research-
ers can examine employees’ impressions of
the magnitude of the three conditions (within
the organization’s locus of control, causing ac-
tual or potential harm, threatening the organi-
zation’s legitimacy). We further suggest that
while intentionality is not a necessary condi-
tion, it will moderate the damage to percep-
tions of trustworthiness by contributing to in-
terpretations of the failure’s magnitude. If the
organization’s (in)action is perceived as delib-
erate or premeditated (e.g., Firestone/Bridges-
tone’s keeping secret known potentially
deadly faults with their tires; BBC Online,
2000), the damage will be worse than if it is
perceived as unintended.
Another intriguing avenue for future research
is to examine our assertion that the assumptions
and recommendations for interpersonal trust re-
pair are not readily transferable to the organi-
zational level. Organizations have capacities for
trust repair unavailable to individuals, such as
replacing “guilty” agents with new agents who
symbolize a change in values, obtaining exter-
nal validations of integrity and competence
(e.g., accreditations), and using public relations
and marketing activities to change their reputa-
tion.
When field studies into live trust repair pro-
cesses are difficult to secure, we encourage ret-
rospective case study methods (cf. Elangovan &
Shapiro, 1998), including document analysis and
interviews, to explore organizational decision
making and its outcomes, and thereby to test
aspects of our framework. Examining different
companies’ responses following a sector-wide
breakdown in trust (e.g., accounting firms’ con-
sultant-auditor conflicts of interest post-Enron)
would help control for external factors and pro-
vide a clearer evaluation of different repair
strategies. Role play and scenario experiments
could also be used to test the relative influence
of different trust repair strategies in a controlled
way.
A concluding remark: While the influence of
the external environment should not be over-
stated, amoral and malevolent organizational
choices and errors often occur in response to
structurally embedded pressures and con-
straints (e.g., performance targets, tight budgets,
competitor tactics). A common impression is that
the imperatives and incentives that invite un-
ethical opportunism are increasing while the
strength of countervailing constraints is de-
creasing (e.g., deregulation, ineffective monitor-
ing), resulting in an external environment that is
more demanding, more unpredictable, and more
conducive to trust failures (Thompson, 2003). Yet
even in this hostile context, signals about which
behaviors are rewarded and punished are sent
by all of us, as citizens, customers, investors,
advisors, and employees.
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